Who Is Equifax (EFX)?: A Data Infrastructure Company That Embeds Credit, Income, and Identity Verification into Underwriting Workflows

* This report is prepared based on data as of 2026-01-08.

1. The business in middle-school terms: Equifax helps “verify creditworthiness” for other people

Equifax is, at its core, a credit and verification data company. When individuals or businesses take out loans, apply for credit cards, rent an apartment, buy insurance, or apply for government assistance, someone has to underwrite the decision—basic questions like “Can this person actually repay?” and “Does this person really work where they say they do?”

Equifax supplies the data and decision inputs that banks, businesses, and government agencies use to make those calls—and it earns fees by helping underwriting happen faster and with consistent quality. A simple analogy: it’s like the person who takes attendance, quiz scores, and classroom behavior and turns it into an easy-to-grade summary so the teacher (a bank or agency) can decide pass/fail.

Who are the customers? (Primarily B2B; consumer is secondary)

The customer base is primarily B2B (and government): banks, card issuers, mortgage participants, corporates (hiring/vendor screening), insurers, telecom/utilities, and government agencies. Equifax also offers consumer services that let individuals view their credit information or protect their identity, but the business is fundamentally centered on use cases for the party doing the underwriting.

What does it sell? (Four pillars)

• Credit information and credit scores:Aggregates payment history and other data and returns underwriting inputs (including scores).
• Employment and income verification (The Work Number):Answers “Is this person employed?” and “What is their income?” for financial institutions, landlords, governments, and others. This is an especially important pillar in mortgage and rental screening.
• Government benefits eligibility support:Makes income verification for benefits eligibility easier to execute across a broader range of work arrangements (e.g., alternative income) (e.g., Complete Income).
• Identity verification and fraud prevention:Supports identity verification and impersonation detection, improving underwriting safety.

How does it make money? (Usage-based + contracts + value-add)

Equifax’s revenue model blends per-inquiry fees (usage-based), enterprise contracts (subscription-like), and incremental fees for analytics and decision support. As underwriting, verification, and identity-resolution activity rises across the economy, usage typically increases as well—creating a structure that can translate into revenue growth.

Recent-to-forward direction: from a “verification company” to a “decision acceleration” company via cloud and AI

In recent years, Equifax has been migrating to a cloud platform (Equifax Cloud), aiming to make stability, processing speed, security, and faster product development core strengths. The goal is not simply an IT move, but to pair cost reduction with a shift toward being “a company that builds new products and grows.”

As future pillars, management highlights expanding EFX.AI so the company not only provides data but also helps clarify “how to decide.” That includes strengthening models that assess not just “risk (probability of non-payment)” but also “capacity to pay,” and improving income verification for government use cases by incorporating bank data and other sources. The more these initiatives scale, the more the business can potentially raise value (price) per transaction.

At this point, it should be clear that EFX functions like infrastructure, selling “underwriting essentials.” Next, we look at the company’s “type” through investor-relevant metrics.

2. Long-term fundamentals: steady revenue, but earnings and cash can be distorted—“a cycle-exposed data service”

Lynch classification: Cyclicals-leaning (but a hybrid, not a textbook cyclical)

In this dataset, the name is flagged as Cyclicals. The point isn’t that the product is a commodity that simply swings with GDP; it’s that results are influenced by inquiry volumes tied to mortgages, credit, and employment, which rise and fall with the macro and rate environment. It’s most accurate to think of it as data infrastructure with cyclical exposure.

Long-term growth: revenue compounds at a mid pace, while earnings and FCF are volatile

• Revenue CAGR:~8.8% annually over the past 10 years and ~10.1% annually over the past 5 years. On an FY basis, revenue increased from $4.13bn in 2020 to $5.68bn in 2024.
• EPS:~5.0% CAGR over the past 10 years. The path is uneven, including an FY loss year; for example, 4.40 in 2019 → -3.18 in 2020 → 4.24 in 2021, a sharp reversal.
• FCF:~4.4% CAGR over the past 10 years. Year-to-year volatility is significant, with swings such as $132.6m in 2022 → $515.5m in 2023 → $813m in 2024.

Note that the 5-year CAGR for EPS and FCF cannot be calculated (insufficient data) within the scope of these materials, so it’s important not to state a numeric 5-year growth rate.

Profitability: ROE is within the historical range but toward the low end; FCF margin is improving

• ROE:~12.6% in the latest FY. Versus the 5-year median (~16.4%), the latest sits toward the lower end of the 5-year range.
• FCF margin:~16.8% on the latest TTM. On an FY basis, ~14.3% in 2024. Versus the 5-year median (~12.7%), TTM is higher.

Margins can look different between FY and TTM, but that largely reflects differences in measurement periods (annual investment timing and seasonality can be mixed in).

How the cycle shows up: less like repeated peaks/troughs, more like “a large drawdown → recovery”

In this dataset, what stands out is not a neat pattern of repeated peaks and troughs, but a major drawdown that included a loss year, followed by recovery. On the latest TTM, EPS is 5.307, revenue is $5.9433bn, and FCF is $999.4m, confirming profitability and cash generation. Based on these materials, that suggests the company is “not at the bottom” and may be in a post-recovery steady-state that extends into an expansion phase. Even so, sensitivity to demand drivers (credit inquiries, mortgages, etc.) remains.

Decomposing growth drivers: less about buybacks, more about “revenue expansion and maintaining/recovering profitability”

Long-term EPS growth is best understood as being driven primarily by revenue growth and maintaining or recovering profitability, rather than by meaningful share-count reduction.

Next, we check whether this long-term “type” (a cyclicals-leaning hybrid) also shows up in the near-term data.

3. Near-term momentum (TTM / latest 8 quarters): revenue is decelerating; earnings and cash are strong

Latest 1 year (TTM): all three key metrics are positive

• EPS growth (TTM YoY):+18.1%
• Revenue growth (TTM YoY):+6.36%
• FCF growth (TTM YoY):+27.6%

Over the past year, the key metrics have not simultaneously rolled over into negative territory. That said, EPS and FCF are growing far faster than revenue (in the ~6% range), implying that earnings and cash improvement are doing most of the work (the primary driver is not identified within the scope of these materials).

Momentum call: EPS is Stable, revenue is Decelerating, FCF is Accelerating

These materials characterize the setup as EPS is Stable, revenue is Decelerating, and FCF is Accelerating. In other words, revenue is running below the medium-term average, while earnings and cash generation are improving enough to offset that.

Consistency over 8 quarters (latest 2 years): less about the growth rate, more about “continuous upward direction”

• EPS:~+10.0% on a 2-year CAGR-equivalent basis; trend is strongly upward (correlation +0.95)
• Revenue:~+6.24% on a 2-year CAGR-equivalent basis; trend is very strongly upward (correlation +0.997)
• FCF:~+39.2% on a 2-year CAGR-equivalent basis; trend is strongly upward (correlation +0.98)

Revenue growth is below the “5-year average (~+10.1%),” which is why it’s described as a deceleration. Still, the 2-year trend itself is upward—growth is compounding rather than contracting.

How margins (FY) and cash (TTM) can diverge: there can be periods where they do not align

FY operating margin was ~20.6% in 2022 → ~17.7% in 2023 → ~18.3% in 2024, implying the last three years have been “flat to slightly soft.” Meanwhile, TTM FCF margin is ~16.8%, which is relatively elevated. The FY vs. TTM gap reflects period effects, and profitability and cash generation don’t always move in lockstep—an important checkpoint going forward.

4. Financial soundness (inputs for bankruptcy-risk thinking): run on cash generation, but the cash cushion is not particularly thick

Leverage and debt burden

• Debt-to-equity (debt relative to equity, FY):~1.04x
• Net Debt / EBITDA (FY):~2.81x

This is not a near net-cash balance sheet; leverage appears to be part of the operating profile depending on the phase. That said, Net Debt / EBITDA is within the company’s normal range over the past 5 and 10 years, and currently sits somewhat toward the lighter-burden side versus its own history.

Interest coverage and cash cushion

• Interest coverage (FY):~4.54x
• Cash cushion indicator (FY):~0.094

Interest coverage is positive and not signaling extreme stress, but it’s also not high enough to call “very robust”; the cleanest framing is moderate headroom. The cash cushion is not especially thick, and if external shocks (regulatory responses, litigation, incremental investment, etc.) overlap, liquidity planning can become a more meaningful consideration.

5. Cash flow quality: EPS and FCF are broadly aligned, but the drivers of volatility require scrutiny

On the latest TTM, EPS is positive (5.307) and FCF is also positive at ~$999.4m, confirming cash generation. In the near term, this is a period where “profits are positive and cash is also positive,” so alignment is easier to observe.

That said, annual FCF has swung meaningfully (e.g., 2022 → 2024). Even in strong cash periods, it remains important to monitor whether volatility is being amplified by working capital or investment timing. These materials also show “flat-to-slightly soft” FY operating margin alongside strong recent cash generation, leaving open the question of whether cash strength reflects one-off factors or whether post-cloud-migration efficiency is showing through (no conclusion is made here).

6. Dividends and capital allocation: dividends are not the “main event,” but supplemental shareholder returns

How to position the dividend

EFX’s dividend yield (TTM) is ~0.694%, which is low for a classic dividend stock. It’s therefore more appropriate to view the dividend as a supplemental component of total return (growth plus shareholder returns), not the primary reason to own the shares.

Dividend level and burden (TTM)

• Dividend per share (TTM):$1.77599
• Payout ratio vs. earnings (TTM):~33.5%
• Payout ratio vs. FCF (TTM):~22.1%
• FCF dividend coverage (TTM):~4.53x

Dividends are well covered by cash flow, but this is also a profile that has to be managed alongside the broader balance sheet (leverage, interest burden, cash cushion). In these materials, dividend stability is described as “moderate.”

Dividend growth and track record (facts)

• Years paying dividends:36 years
• Years of consecutive dividend increases:0 years
• Most recent year with a dividend reduction/cut:2024
• Dividend per share CAGR:~+4.66% annually over 10 years; ~-0.18% annually over 5 years (flat to slightly down)
• Most recent 1-year increase (TTM):~+15.3%

While the company has a long dividend history, the medium-term record (past 5 years) includes periods where growth stalled, and it is not a profile that raises the dividend every year. The most recent 1-year increase is relatively large, but it should be treated as a single-year change rather than assumed to be a durable trend.

Note on peer comparison

Because these materials do not include peer dividend distributions, we do not provide a numeric industry ranking. Given the absolute yield of ~0.7%, we limit the takeaway to the view that income appeal is generally likely to be modest.

7. Current valuation positioning (company historical only): PER/PEG are within range; FCF metrics are high vs. 5-year; leverage is within range

Here we map “where we are today” using EFX’s own historical data, rather than market averages or peer comparisons (5-year as the primary anchor, 10-year as secondary, 2-year for directionality).

PER: broadly within the 5-year range; toward the high side on a 10-year view

• PER (TTM):41.60x (at a share price of $220.78999)
• Past 5 years:Median 42.91x; within the normal range of 35.30–51.43x (within the 5-year window, somewhat above the midpoint)
• Past 10 years:Clearly above the median of 29.19x; toward the high side within the 10-year range
• Direction over the past 2 years:There was a period at elevated levels, and it has recently moderated somewhat (downward)

Given the cyclicals-leaning profile, a high PER doesn’t neatly fit the classic “cheap at the bottom of the cycle” setup. It could also be interpreted as the market assigning some value to growth and stability (no conclusion on appropriateness is made here).

PEG: within the 5-year range; somewhat elevated vs. 10-year

• PEG (TTM):2.30
• Past 5 years:Near the middle (slightly above the midpoint) and within range
• Past 10 years:Somewhat high versus the median of 1.66
• Direction over the past 2 years:There was a phase positioned outside the normal range (lower side), and it has recently returned into range

FCF yield: above the 5-year range; within the 10-year range

• FCF yield (TTM):3.70%
• Past 5 years:Breaks above the normal range (high side versus the period)
• Past 10 years:Within the normal range
• Direction over the past 2 years:Recovered from low (including negative) phases back into positive territory and rose

ROE: within both 5- and 10-year ranges, but currently toward the low end

• ROE (FY):12.59%
• Past 5 years:Within the normal range (near the lower bound)
• Past 10 years:Within range, toward the low side
• Direction over the past 2 years:(In the TTM series) there are phases of decline

FCF margin: above the 5-year range; within the 10-year range but toward the high side

• FCF margin (TTM):16.82%
• Past 5 years:Breaks above the normal range
• Past 10 years:Within range, toward the high side
• Direction over the past 2 years:There are phases of improvement

Net Debt / EBITDA: as an inverse indicator, currently within range and somewhat low (lighter burden)

Net Debt / EBITDA is an inverse indicator: the smaller it is (the more negative it is), the lower the pressure from net interest-bearing debt and the greater the financial flexibility.

• Net Debt / EBITDA (FY):2.81x
• Past 5 and 10 years:Both within the normal range, with the current level (relative to company history) somewhat toward the low side
• Direction over the past 2 years:There was a phase where it swung higher, and it has recently declined and stabilized

Current positioning across six metrics (a map, not a judgment)

• Valuation (PER/PEG):Broadly within the 5-year range; toward the high side on a 10-year view
• Cash quality (FCF yield/FCF margin):High side (breakout) versus the past 5 years
• Profitability (ROE):Within range, but currently toward the low end
• Leverage (Net Debt / EBITDA):Within range and somewhat low

8. What has made this company win: not data volume, but “workflow-embedded operating infrastructure”

Equifax’s core value is delivering underwriting essentials—credit, employment/income, and identity/fraud—in a way that’s embedded in customers’ workflows (financial institutions, landlords, governments, and others). Underwriting is an area where mistakes are costly and manual processes don’t scale, which is why data and systems become true infrastructure.

That stickiness is not simply a function of having a lot of data.

• Fast response performance and operations that deliver consistent quality
• Deep integration into customers’ core systems and underwriting workflows
• Operating design that supports regulatory compliance, audit readiness, and evidentiary trails

The stronger this “operationally embedded system” becomes, the harder it is for customers to switch.

9. Is the story still intact? The post-cloud “offense” fits the winning playbook

Management’s recent narrative can be summarized as: “finish the defense (trust, safety, rebuilding the foundation) → move to offense (new products, integrated solutions).” That’s consistent with what makes an underwriting infrastructure provider win—stable operations, operating quality, and audit readiness.

More specifically, with the cloud foundation in place, the company is signaling a push to thicken delivered value by bundling not only credit but also income/employment, fraud prevention, and decision support—and by integrating AI on the side of “advancing customer decision-making” rather than just “internal efficiency.” Read this as an effort to expand price per unit and breadth of use: moving from a “verification company” to a “decision acceleration” company.

However, the “shift in messaging” matters: in mortgage score competition, it has begun to foreground price and delivery format

One notable change over the past 1–2 years is that, as mortgage score competition has intensified, Equifax has increasingly emphasized price and delivery format—more often positioning itself as “the party that triggers competition.” That doesn’t contradict the numbers (revenue is decelerating somewhat, while earnings and cash are strong), but it does raise the importance of where and how the company defends pricing, bundled value, and switching costs.

In addition, remediation and payments tied to the 2017 large-scale data breach continue. For a business where trust is part of the product, reputational friction is likely to remain a relevant factor.

10. Invisible Fragility: how deterioration can start “before it shows up in the numbers”

This section does not claim deterioration is imminent. Instead, it lays out structural weak points that often surface before financial metrics when things begin to break.

• Sensitivity to the mortgage ecosystem:Policy changes, standards changes, and pricing revisions can coincide with swings in inquiry volumes. The more unstable the value share of standalone scores becomes, the more the pace of migration to bundles (credit + incremental data) becomes the key question.
• Rapid shifts in the competitive environment (policy/standards/price-led dynamics):If rules and pricing drive a greater share of competition relative to technology differentiation, differentiation shifts toward operations, value-add, and bundling.
• Commoditization risk:If the product is simply a credit report, it’s easier to compare and shop. If incremental value (employment/income indicators, alternative data, decision support) can’t be layered on continuously, pricing negotiations are more likely to move front and center.
• Supply chain/partner contagion risk:As data sources and partners expand, an incident anywhere can more easily cascade into a trust issue (a structural vulnerability of the industry). Within the search window for these materials, no decisive fact was confirmed that “Equifax caused a new large-scale breach,” but the risk of industry-wide incident contagion remains.
• Deterioration in organizational culture:For infrastructure services, operating quality (incident response, data corrections, support, audit readiness) shapes the customer experience. Fatigue often shows up first as slower exception handling and more variable quality.
• “Gradual” erosion in profitability:ROE has been trending toward the lower end of the historical range, and weakness could persist as a slow decline in capital efficiency rather than a sudden drop. Also, the combination of flat-to-slightly soft FY operating margin and strong recent cash generation needs validation.
• Opacity of financial burden:There is interest-coverage capacity, but the cash cushion is not especially thick. If the premise of “running on cash generation” breaks under an external shock, conditions could tighten quickly.
• Residual regulatory/policy/trust risk:Remediation tied to past data leakage continues, and consumer trust issues can be easily resurfaced. Even if B2B customers behave rationally, friction can still arise in the field around consent collection and complaint handling.

11. Competitive landscape: from standalone credit reports to a fight over “cross-domain bundles + operating design + integration”

EFX competes in credit information (reports/scores) while expanding the underwriting stack across employment/income verification, identity verification and fraud prevention, and decision support. Because regulation, audits, and accountability matter—and because products are embedded in customers’ core workflows—competition isn’t decided by feature checklists alone. That said, in the mortgage ecosystem, the playing field can shift meaningfully due to policy, standards, and pricing.

Key competitive players (the roster changes by domain)

• Experian:Often competes in credit information, identity/fraud, and decision support.
• TransUnion:Competition can extend beyond credit information into identity/fraud, credit model enhancement, and employment/income verification.
• FICO:Deeply involved in mortgage-centric credit score standards; changes in score distribution channels (e.g., direct sales) can affect the value share of credit bureaus.
• VantageScore:A score aligned with the policy narrative of promoting competition in mortgages. In practice, competition centers on who sells it and how it’s bundled and distributed.
• Truework (VOIE context):An adjacent player gaining presence in employment/income verification, potentially creating pressure via partnerships and other routes.
• IDV specialist vendors (e.g., Incode):Forces pushing modularization of identity verification; credit bureaus are likely to compete on delivered value through integration.

What tends to become the competitive axis by domain

• Credit information (reports):Data quality, stability of inquiry response, customer system integration, pricing/contracts (often most visible in mortgages).
• Mortgage score supply:Policy/standards (which scores are accepted), distribution channels (via credit bureaus vs. direct), and bundling design (workflow productization of credit reports + incremental indicators).
• Employment/income verification (VOIE):Coverage, response rate/speed, exception handling and audit readiness, payroll/HR system integrations.
• Identity verification and fraud prevention:Balancing IDV accuracy and friction, integrating device/behavior/attribute signals, and tighter coupling with credit data and decision engines.
• Decision support:How data is bundled, operating design including rules/models/monitoring, and ease of integration with customer data.

Competitive KPIs investors should monitor (observation points, not numbers)

• Score adoption status in mortgages (pace of practical adoption of VantageScore 4.0)
• Changes in score distribution channels (penetration of direct sales; changing role of credit bureaus)
• Whether bundling “credit report + incremental indicators (employment/income, alternative data, etc.)” becomes standardized
• Expansion of partnerships/integration in VOIE, and signals around response rate/speed/exception-handling burden
• Differentiation axes when external IDV integration becomes table stakes (integrated UX, audits, continuous monitoring)
• Whether large customers’ multi-vendor strategies and pricing model changes are becoming structural rather than one-off

12. Moat (barriers to entry) and durability: data + operations + integration. However, mortgages can shift the playing field

EFX’s moat isn’t fully explained by “data volume” alone. It’s built on a combination of:

• Data:Ability to bundle underwriting inputs beyond credit, including employment/income and identity/fraud.
• Operations:Delivery as business infrastructure, including exception handling, corrections, and audit readiness.
• Integration:Durability (switching costs) created by being embedded into customers’ decision workflows.

At the same time, structural forces could weaken that moat: the mortgage score market becoming more driven by policy/standards/pricing, and score distribution shifting toward direct sales, which could reduce credit bureaus to a pass-through role. As a result, durability depends less on standalone credit reports and more on whether the company can shift toward workflow products that integrate credit + income/employment + fraud + decision support.

13. Structural position in the AI era: can be a tailwind or a headwind, but the key is “standardization of the middle layer”

Areas likely to strengthen with AI (tailwinds)

• Workflow-embedded network effects:Not a user-community effect, but one where inquiries accumulate because the products are embedded in underwriting workflows.
• Expansion of data advantage:Ability to hold a bundled set of inputs spanning credit, income/employment, and fraud. Delivering anonymized data through the cloud and making it easy to use in customers’ analytics environments can also become a competitive axis.
• Degree of AI integration:Integrating AI into the decision-engine side that accelerates underwriting decisions, and beginning to launch agent-type solutions (e.g., Ignite AI Advisor).
• Mission-critical nature:Underwriting typically retains accountability and audit requirements, which can make infrastructure value—data, operations, and evidentiary trails—more durable.

Areas that could weaken with AI (headwinds)

• Disintermediation (direct connection) and commoditization:If direct sales and modularized score supply advance, the traditional value share could come under pressure.
• Modularization competition:If IDV and similar functions proliferate as API components, differentiation shifts toward integration excellence, and multi-vendor adoption can increase.

Conclusion (structural layer): not an OS, but the underwriting “middle layer”

EFX sits closer to the underwriting “middle layer” of data and judgment across domains like finance, employment, and benefits. Even if top-layer applications become AI-native, Equifax can remain an intermediate platform that bundles and returns explainable decision inputs, verification data, and fraud prevention. However, standalone scores face greater pressure to be absorbed—creating a duality.

14. Leadership and corporate culture: an “execution-oriented” profile that completed the rebuild and is shifting into a growth phase

CEO vision and consistency

CEO Mark W. Begor (since April 2018) has recently focused less on changing what the business is and more on rebuilding the foundation beneath it—and then using that foundation to pivot into growth. The narrative emphasizes completing the cloud migration, improving operational stability, security, and development velocity, and then using data assets and AI (EFX.AI) to launch new products and expand value through multi-data offerings. In November 2024, continuation of the CEO role was indicated; limited turnover at the top also supports continuity.

Personal profile (behavioral pattern) and cultural reflection

• An execution type that completes large projects:Publicly emphasizes completion of the cloud migration, pointing to a style that prioritizes planning, control, and execution.
• Stable operations and trust as top priorities:Frames security and trust as prerequisites for enterprise value.
• AI as outward-facing value:More often positioned as customer-ROI value (faster decision-making) than internal efficiency.

Culturally, the company highlights security, accountability, high standards, customer-first, agility, follow-through, One Team, and learning/development—tilting toward the discipline and execution tempo typical of infrastructure businesses.

Cultural watch-out: price-led competition raises the difficulty of “defending while attacking”

If price-led dynamics intensify around mortgage scores, the cultural challenge of maintaining defense (trust and operations) while executing offense (pricing and delivery adjustments, new product launches) increases. In addition, it has been reported that the head of the U.S. Information Solutions segment stepped down in June 2025 and that the CEO is serving in an interim capacity (a topic requiring primary-source confirmation), making it a monitoring item as a potential near-term inflection that could affect priorities and operations.

15. KPI tree for investors: a schematic to understand EFX “before the numbers”

The drivers of EFX’s enterprise value ultimately flow into earnings, FCF, capital efficiency, financial sustainability, and trust—but there are upstream KPIs worth monitoring along the way.

• Inquiry/usage volume:Counts of underwriting/verification events (mortgages, cards, rentals, government benefits, etc.).
• Price per transaction:Typically easier to lift as the mix shifts from data provision toward decision support.
• Degree of workflow embedment:Switching costs rise as integration extends into core operations, audits, and exception handling.
• Data quality and correction operations:Fewer errors and faster corrections reduce operational friction.
• Response performance and stable uptime:The less underwriting workflows are interrupted, the more usage becomes habitual and adoption can expand.
• Effectiveness of fraud prevention:Loss avoidance and compliance support can become adoption drivers.
• Margins and cash conversion efficiency:Ability to convert revenue into cash (including the balance versus investment burden).
• Leverage and interest-coverage capacity:Whether the capital structure can absorb demand volatility and competitive phases.

Constraints include operational load from data corrections, complaint handling, and exception processing; pricing-model complexity; shifts in mortgage policy/standards/distribution channels; ongoing platform and security investment; a thin cash cushion; and reputationally driven friction.

16. Two-minute Drill (long-term investor wrap-up): the “skeleton” to focus on

• Equifax is a data infrastructure company that earns recurring usage by embedding underwriting essentials—credit, income/employment, and identity/fraud—into customers’ workflows.
• Demand, however, is exposed to the macro and rate environment through inquiry volumes in mortgages and credit. In Lynch terms, it’s not a textbook cyclical, but it’s most coherent to view it as a cyclicals-leaning hybrid.
• Over the long run, revenue has grown steadily, but EPS and FCF have been distorted at times by shocks and investment timing—making it easy to misread the business if you assume a smooth growth-stock trajectory.
• On the latest TTM, revenue growth has decelerated versus the 5-year average, but EPS and FCF are strong and FCF margin is elevated, consistent with a post-recovery steady-state moving into an expansion phase.
• The key fork in the road is whether, as direct sales, price-led dynamics, and commoditized requirements advance in the mortgage score market, the company can move beyond standalone credit and standardize a workflow product that integrates credit + income/employment + fraud + decision support.
• Financially, the model leans on cash generation. Interest-coverage capacity is intact, but the cash cushion is not especially thick. Managing profitability and the capital structure in a more aggressive competitive environment is a key monitoring point.