What makes Kinsale Capital (KNSL) a strong insurer: an E&S model that quickly selects “hard-to-place” risks and wins through discipline and a low-cost structure

* This report is based on data as of 2026-02-16.

What does this company do?—In one sentence for middle schoolers

Kinsale Capital Group (KNSL), in one sentence, is “a company that makes money by specializing in underwriting ‘hard-to-insure’ risks that ordinary insurers don’t want to take.” It focuses on submissions that fall outside standard insurance (coverage sold at scale under relatively fixed rules)—situations where loss frequency and severity are harder to predict, terms are more complex, or the underlying industry is specialized.

As an analogy, KNSL is closer to “a specialty clinic that handles tough cases general hospitals struggle to treat.” Its ability to assess risk and set terms (coverage, deductibles, price) case by case is what ultimately drives profitability.

What does it sell: E&S (Excess & Surplus) commercial insurance is the core

KNSL’s core business is specialty property & casualty coverage for businesses (commercial insurance). Its main arena is E&S (Excess & Surplus): it sources submissions the standard market is less willing to write through the wholesale channel, then underwrites them one deal at a time.

Putting the insurance it writes into plain language

In plain English, it provides businesses with “coverage for when things go wrong,” including:

• Coverage when a company injures someone or damages property (liability)
• Coverage for accidents for companies that use vehicles for work (commercial auto)
• Coverage against professional mistakes (professional lines)
• Coverage in areas where cleanup after an incident can be costly, such as environmental pollution (environmental)
• Coverage related to logistics and storage, such as theft and in-transit accidents
• Coverage for cyber incidents (data breaches, etc.)

Who does it sell to: end customers are businesses, the “front door” is wholesale brokers

KNSL doesn’t distribute the way consumer insurers do via TV ads; its “front door” is a network of wholesale intermediaries (wholesale brokers). The insureds are businesses, but the submissions largely arrive through wholesale brokers.

The end-customer base is broad, spanning construction, transportation, real estate, hospitality (hotels and restaurants), energy, technology-adjacent sectors, and many other industries.

How does it make money: two pillars—underwriting profit + investment income

Insurers generally earn money in two ways, and KNSL follows that same playbook.

① Generate profit from premiums (underwriting profit)

KNSL collects premiums and pays claims when losses occur. The spread between the two is the core profit engine. The key question is always: “Which risks do we write, on what terms, and at what price?” If pricing is too aggressive, claims can balloon later; the more consistent the underwriting discipline, the more profit typically remains.

KNSL repeatedly points to “underwriting discipline” and “low-cost operations” as core advantages.

② Invest the premiums received to grow them (investment income)

Because claims are often paid later, insurers invest the premium funds in relatively conservative assets in the meantime. KNSL also notes that investment income has been rising. As underwriting scale expands, investable funds grow as well, which can further broaden the earnings base.

Where is the “winning formula”: the three-piece set of selection, pricing, and low cost

E&S is a market where deal-by-deal judgment matters far more than “selling at scale under uniform rules.” KNSL’s edge can be summarized as a three-part combination:

• Make fast decisions and price quickly: for wholesale brokers, speed of response is often valuable, which can help attract submissions
• Maintain underwriting discipline: it doesn’t write everything, and it can keep selection and terms design consistent
• Low-cost operations through technology: with the same premium base, more profit can drop through, and this can help in periods of price competition

That said, in its largest segment—Commercial Property—the company has flagged intensifying competition and declining rates. In certain environments, that can translate into “lines where growth slows.” This is presented as a reflection of market conditions rather than a pullback or a major strategic pivot.

Future pillars: rather than flashy new businesses, “make the existing underwriting model even stronger”

KNSL is a specialist insurer, and it appears more focused on strengthening its existing underwriting model than on pivoting into a fundamentally different business. Based on recent disclosures, potential future pillars include:

Potential pillar 1: further efficiency in underwriting and operations through technology

Automating administrative work, speeding up submission decisions, and improving pricing accuracy with data can sharpen the ability to “write better risks and avoid worse risks.” This fits squarely with the company’s emphasis on low-cost operations.

Potential pillar 2: broaden product coverage (expand specialty lines)

E&S is essentially a collection of narrow specialty niches. Expanding underwriting scope in response to new loss patterns and emerging needs—such as cyber—could broaden how the company is utilized within the wholesale channel.

Potential pillar 3: demonstrate “strong financial capacity” through capital deployment (enhanced shareholder returns)

In December 2025, the company authorized a new $250 million share repurchase program. While this doesn’t create revenue, for insurers—where capital management is central—it speaks to long-term flexibility and credibility.

Internal infrastructure: not easily monetized as revenue, but “data and operating systems” that determine the profit structure

In insurance, the real differentiators are often less visible “products” and more the internal machinery—how submission information is captured, how quickly decisions are made, how pricing rules are applied, how claims are handled, and how costs are controlled. KNSL’s technology emphasis is best viewed as the backbone of that internal infrastructure.

Current positioning as confirmed in recent news: strengths persist, but property faces headwinds

From the FY2025 and 4Q release published in February 2026, the company continues to frame its E&S focus, underwriting discipline, and low-cost operations as key competitive advantages. At the same time, it calls out intensifying competition and declining rates in its largest segment, Commercial Property—suggesting top-line growth could slow depending on conditions.

The new share repurchase authorization can also be viewed as a signal of confidence in capital allocation—specifically, how management intends to deploy the cash the business generates.

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Long-term fundamentals: over a 10-year span, “high growth × high profitability” has compounded

On an annual (FY) basis, revenue, profit, and EPS have all trended meaningfully higher. For example, revenue grew from $0.064 billion in 2014 to $1.874 billion in 2025, and EPS increased from 0.62 in 2014 to 21.65 in 2025.

Growth rates (long-term compounding)

• EPS average annual growth: past 5 years +41.1%, past 10 years +35.2%
• Revenue average annual growth: past 5 years +32.4%, past 10 years +37.0%
• Free cash flow average annual growth (FY basis): past 5 years +43.1%, past 10 years +28.3%

Profitability (ROE and margins): reached a high level and remains there

ROE (latest FY=2025) is 25.7%. Over the past 10 years, ROE dipped into the low teens in 2017–2018, but it was in the 20s in 2021–2024 and held in the mid-20s in 2025.

Margins are also elevated: operating margin (FY) rose from 31.4% in 2023 to 32.4% in 2024 to 33.8% in 2025, and net margin (FY) increased from 25.2% in 2023 to 26.1% in 2024 to 26.9% in 2025. In other words, the “discipline” and “low cost” described in the business narrative show up cleanly in the reported numbers.

Sources of growth: revenue expansion is the main driver, margins remain elevated, share count is broadly flat

Over the long run, EPS growth has been driven primarily by revenue growth (largely reflecting premium scale), with consistently high margins—recently even improving—on top. Shares outstanding (FY) were 22.136 million in 2019 and 23.259 million in 2025; there’s no clear evidence of meaningful long-term dilution, and shares actually edged down recently (23.332 million in 2024 to 23.259 million in 2025).

Lynch classification: while it has cyclical elements, in practice it is a “high-growth, high-ROE” hybrid

The underlying dataset flags the company as “Cyclicals.” However, FY revenue, net income, and EPS (2014–2025) generally trend upward, and the annual figures don’t read like a classic “peaks and troughs” cycle (sharp drop → sharp rebound).

Accordingly, this article treats KNSL as a “hybrid that can move with insurance pricing and the competitive environment, yet has delivered high growth over the long term.” Supporting data points include the past 5-year EPS average annual growth of +41.1%, revenue average annual growth of +32.4%, and latest FY ROE of 25.7%.

Short-term view (TTM / most recent 8 quarters) of “pattern continuity”: growth continues, but in a deceleration phase

Over the most recent year (TTM), growth is still positive, but it has cooled versus the past 5-year average. That makes this a key checkpoint for whether the long-term pattern is holding in the near term.

Most recent 1 year (TTM) growth

• EPS (TTM) YoY: +22.3%
• Revenue (TTM) YoY: +18.0%

These are still solid growth rates, and the “growth-company pattern” hasn’t clearly broken. But relative to the past 5-year CAGR (EPS +41.1%, revenue +32.4%), the company appears to have shifted from very high growth to “high growth, but at a slower pace.”

Shape over the past 2 years (8 quarters): directionally a strong upward trend

• EPS: past 2-year CAGR equivalent +20.2% per year, trend correlation +0.97
• Revenue: past 2-year CAGR equivalent +18.5% per year, trend correlation +1.00

Even with slower growth, the two-year trend correlations remain strong, which supports the view of continued “smoothed growth” rather than a sudden break.

Short-term margin trend (FY): improving, if anything

Even as revenue and EPS growth have moderated, operating margin (FY) improved from 31.4% in 2023 to 32.4% in 2024 to 33.8% in 2025. Again, that’s consistent with the “discipline” and “low-cost operations” narrative.

FCF (TTM) is difficult to confirm: near-term validation is on hold

Because the most recent TTM free cash flow (FCF) data are insufficient, this material alone can’t support a definitive read on near-term cash generation via TTM growth rates or yields. That is not evidence that cash generation is “bad”—only that it’s hard to evaluate in this window, and investors need to triangulate using other inputs (FY trends, capital allocation, underwriting quality).

On an FY basis, FCF accumulation over time is confirmed (e.g., past 5-year CAGR +43.1%). Where FY and TTM differ, the cleanest framing is a visibility gap driven by the time window.

Financial soundness (framing bankruptcy-risk considerations): low leverage and ample interest coverage

Insurers aren’t always directly comparable to non-financial corporates, but based on the data presented, the company does not appear to be leaning on debt to create growth.

• Debt ratio (debt/equity, FY2025): 11.5%
• Net Debt / EBITDA (FY2025): -3.27x (negative = net cash direction)
• Cash ratio (FY2025): 19.36
• Interest coverage (FY2025): 59.6x

On these metrics, the data do not point to an “immediate liquidity-driven crisis” in a bankruptcy-risk sense. That said, because insurance losses often show up after a lag, investors shouldn’t take comfort from leverage ratios alone; they need to be monitored alongside reinsurance structure (retention) and loss trends (including long-tail liability).

Shareholder returns: dividends are small; buybacks tend to be the focal point

KNSL pays a dividend, but the past 5-year and 10-year average dividend yield is 0.26% per year—very low and unlikely to be a primary income driver. While the facts include 11 years of dividend payments, 8 consecutive years of dividend increases, and the most recent dividend cut in 2016, TTM dividend yield and payout ratio (earnings-based) data are insufficient, so this is an area where firm conclusions should be avoided.

In practice, buybacks (the $250 million authorization in December 2025) are more likely to be the main shareholder-return lever, framed as part of capital allocation that “returns excess capital while maintaining strong financial capacity.”

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Where valuation stands today (company historical only): “map it” with six indicators

From here, without comparing to the broader market or peers, we’ll frame “where it is today” strictly against KNSL’s own historical data. The primary reference is the past 5-year range, with the past 10-year range as a supplement; the most recent 2 years are used only for directional context. The six indicators are PEG, PER, free cash flow yield, ROE, free cash flow margin, and Net Debt / EBITDA (share price assumption: $371.32).

PEG: within the historical range, toward the low end

PEG is 0.77x, within the typical past 5-year and 10-year ranges. It’s below the past 5-year median (1.08x), which—historically—suggests the market is assigning a more conservative value to growth than it has in the past.

PER: below the typical past 5-year and 10-year ranges

PER (TTM) is 17.1x, below both the typical past 5-year range (26.1–43.0x) and the typical past 10-year range (25.8–42.6x). Over the most recent two years, the direction has been from higher levels toward lower levels.

This does not claim “undervaluation.” It simply states that today’s multiple is low relative to the company’s own historical distribution. As context, it’s possible the market is taking a more cautious view on growth durability and the competitive backdrop (including softening insurance rates), but this section stays at the level of positioning rather than turning conjecture into a conclusion.

Free cash flow yield: cannot place the current level (insufficient data)

Because free cash flow yield (TTM) data are insufficient, the typical past 5-year range (6.76%–9.02%) and typical past 10-year range (7.20%–9.57%) can be shown, but it’s not possible to determine “where it sits today.” On the historical map, this remains a blank.

ROE: around the middle of the past 5 years, toward the high end of the past 10 years

ROE (latest FY) is 25.7%, placing it around the middle of the typical past 5-year range and toward the high end of the typical past 10-year range (near the upper bound of ~26.2%). On a company-historical basis, profitability is currently in a strong zone.

Free cash flow margin: cannot place the current level (insufficient data)

Free cash flow margin (TTM) also has insufficient data. While distributions such as the typical past 5-year range (58.7%–66.5%) can be shown, it’s not possible to determine near-term directionality or whether the current level is inside or outside the range.

Net Debt / EBITDA: negative and net-cash leaning, but “less negative” than the past

Net Debt / EBITDA is an inverse indicator: the smaller the value (the more negative), the stronger the net cash position and the greater the financial flexibility. KNSL’s current value (latest FY) is -3.27x, which still reflects a net-cash tilt.

However, relative to history, it sits toward the upper end (i.e., less negative) of the typical past 5-year range (-9.14 to -2.59x), and it appears somewhat “above” (again, less negative) versus the typical past 10-year range (-10.80 to -4.93x). Over the most recent two years, the direction also points toward a shallower net-cash position. This is not a good-or-bad judgment—just a way to locate today’s balance-sheet posture versus the past.

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Cash flow tendencies (quality and direction): EPS is growing, but TTM FCF is hard to validate

Over the long term (FY), the data show FCF accumulating alongside EPS growth and margin improvement—suggesting that “growth and cash generation moved together.” However, because TTM FCF data are insufficient, this material alone can’t confirm whether near-term alignment between EPS and FCF has weakened (or whether visibility is simply distorted by timing effects tied to investment, investment income, or underwriting dynamics).

For insurers, the relationship between accounting earnings and cash can shift with loss reserve estimates, reinsurance structure, and accident-year dynamics. As a practical investor approach, it’s reasonable to explicitly note that “TTM confirmation isn’t possible here,” and then assess quality through multiple lenses such as FY trends, capital allocation (including the sustainability of buybacks), and whether margins hold up in a more competitive phase.

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Success story: why it has won (the essence)

In one sentence, KNSL’s success story is that it has “honed a repeatable operating model (discipline × low cost × data-driven execution) as an underwriting specialist—quickly evaluating specialized commercial risks that standard insurance struggles to handle, structuring terms accordingly, and capturing profit deal by deal.”

In this business, value is less about “product names” and more about repeatable underwriting decisions, data operations, and execution. It also matters that as more submissions flow through the wholesale channel, selection improves—and strong results can attract more submissions—creating a reinforcing loop.

Story continuity: are recent strategies consistent with the success story?

Recent messaging is consistent: rather than pursuing flashy diversification, the company emphasizes “staying focused on E&S and compounding value across cycles through disciplined underwriting and technology-enabled low-cost operations.” While growth has moderated in the latest TTM, ROE remains high at 25.7% in the latest FY and margins are improving. As a result, a shift in emphasis from “maximizing growth rates” to “protecting the model (discipline and cost)” does not appear to conflict with the current numerical setup.

In addition, the more visible use of the management lever of increasing reinsurance retention (the net portion retained) to support net growth is a rational response to the competitive environment and can influence reported growth. However, as discussed later, it can also increase loss volatility—making it an important point to monitor when evaluating story continuity.

Narrative shift underway: from ultra-fast growth to “grow while protecting discipline (but with more normalized growth rates)”

Within the available materials, three shifts stand out in how the story is being framed:

• A change in how growth is positioned: from ultra-high long-term growth to a more normalized recent phase (TTM EPS +22.3%, revenue +18.0%)
• The largest segment (Commercial Property) shifting from tailwind to headwind: rate declines and intensifying competition (including the standard market) are cited as factors that could push premiums down versus the prior year
• The lever of raising reinsurance (net retention) stands out: it can influence the appearance of net growth, but it can also increase the volatility of losses borne by the company

This reads less like “the business broke” and more like a shift in emphasis as the competitive environment evolves—where the winning formula depends less on sheer growth speed and more on the operating pattern (discipline, selection, low cost). That framing fits the broader set of materials more cleanly.

Invisible Fragility: points to question first when something looks strong

Here, without asserting “it is bad right now,” we lay out the structural “fault lines” that often show up first when an otherwise strong story starts to weaken.

1) Dependence on the wholesale broker channel: potential bias at the submission “front door” and partner concentration

Because the wholesale intermediary channel is the primary battleground, broker preferences—and concentration among top partners—can become structural risks. If key intermediaries shift submission share toward competitors, submission “quality and quantity” can deteriorate before rate levels or loss ratios reflect it.

2) Abrupt shifts in the competitive environment: especially price softening in commercial property and re-entry by the standard market

The company itself explicitly cites rate declines and intensifying competition (including the standard market) in its largest segment. The most dangerous outcome for a specialist model is being pushed into unprofitable business to defend volume—breaking discipline in the process. If discipline breaks, losses often surface with a lag, so results can still look strong for a period—another form of fragility.

3) Risk that the “relative value” of technology advantages shrinks

KNSL highlights low-cost operations as a strength, but if competitors also step up investment, the advantage isn’t permanent and must be continually refreshed. If core system modernization or AI adoption stalls (migration delays, reduced frontline productivity), the impact can gradually show up in the expense line.

4) Reinsurance and retention design: the higher the net retention, the greater the volatility in “hit years”

Higher retention can lift net written premiums, but it also increases loss volatility. Even if margins look stable from the outside, year-to-year results can swing more sharply due to natural catastrophes and similar events.

5) Limited visibility into the “composition” of profitability: if prior accident-year development contributes too much, underlying strength is harder to gauge

Recent disclosures indicate that favorable prior loss reserve development (improvement in accident years) has contributed to profits. That can reflect strong operations, but investors should avoid relying solely on “normal-time optics,” because if development reverses, reported results can deteriorate quickly.

6) Deterioration in financial burden: current signals are limited, but insurance hits with a lag

At present, based on metrics such as interest coverage (59.6x in FY2025), signs of a debt-driven breakdown appear limited. However, because insurance losses emerge with a lag, investors should not rely only on borrowing metrics and should evaluate retention design and loss trends (especially long-tail liability) in tandem.

7) Industry structure changes: property is softening, while liability is becoming more difficult due to social inflation

As a near-term industry observation, property is described as more prone to rate declines, while liability and auto are described as facing pressures that can increase loss severity. To the extent KNSL shifts from property toward other lines, uncertainty around long-tail risk (and the difficulty of reserve estimation) could rise—another form of Invisible Fragility.

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Competitive environment: who it competes with, where it competes, and what determines outcomes

KNSL competes less on “insurance as a boxed product” and more in a market where outcomes are driven by end-to-end underwriting execution—speed of quoting and accept/decline decisions on wholesale-sourced submissions, granularity of terms design, pricing discipline, and low operating costs.

Key competitors (examples): counterparties rotate by line

• W. R. Berkley (WRB)
• RLI (RLI)
• James River (JRVR)
• AIG (specialty and surplus lines units such as Lexington)
• Berkshire Hathaway–affiliated specialty P&C areas
• Depending on market conditions, large standard-market insurers (especially likely to re-enter when Property softens)

One important nuance: KNSL isn’t competing against a single fixed rival. Competitors vary by line, and Commercial Property in particular tends to see sharper price competition as capacity expands—often pulling the standard market back into the mix.

Competitive characteristics by area

• Commercial Property: in a rate-softening phase, the ability to maintain discipline and decline business can be valuable, but generating top-line growth becomes more difficult
• Liability (General/Excess Liability, etc.): long-tail risk assessment, terms design, and claims-handling design are critical
• Professional liability and specialized niches: data accumulation, expertise, and renewal management tend to differentiate
• Emerging areas such as cyber: coverage design and exposure management are challenging, and competition can swing with capital supply and the reinsurance backdrop

Switching costs: the key is wholesale-side prioritization rather than the end customer

End-customer switching costs are unlikely to resemble SaaS, but there can still be practical stickiness through renewals, transfer of prior loss information, and accumulated negotiation experience. More important is the wholesale broker side: response speed, consistency of terms, and willingness to handle exceptions can shift “placement priority.” That plays to KNSL’s strengths—but it also means losing the “front door” can show up quickly.

Moat: resides not in brand, but in “learning loop + low cost + discipline”

KNSL’s moat is better understood not as consumer brand power (advertising), but as a bundle of capabilities that matter in E&S execution:

• Data and learning loop: continuously refine segmentation and pricing discipline through accumulated submission data
• Low-cost operations: more profit can drop through on the same premium base, supporting resilience when rates soften
• Underwriting discipline: the ability to walk away in competitive phases helps avoid long-term losses
• Trust in the wholesale channel: fast responses and consistent decisions can reinforce the cycle of submissions → selection → results → submissions

That said, durability depends less on adopting tools and more on whether the company keeps widening the gap through execution after adoption. As peers roll out similar automation, the moat increasingly requires ongoing renewal of relative advantage.

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Structural positioning in the AI era: AI is likely a tailwind, but it also intensifies competition

KNSL isn’t an AI infrastructure provider; it sits in the implementation (application) layer within financial services, where underwriting, investing, reinsurance, and administration are executed. In recent disclosures, the company describes a push to expand AI usage—raising productivity through day-to-day use of bots and agents across processes including underwriting—and tying that to improved risk segmentation and pricing accuracy.

How AI can be a tailwind

• Document processing, submission triage, and quoting support can make underwriting faster and more consistent
• It can further strengthen the low-cost operations advantage and help sustain results in rate-softening phases
• The ability to fully leverage accumulated data becomes more important, and differences in learning loops can matter more

How AI can intensify competition (potential headwinds)

• Productivity tools are likely to diffuse across the industry, narrowing “tool-based” differentiation
• If AI also spreads on the wholesale broker side, submission allocation could become more efficient—potentially intensifying competition at the “front door”
• Ultimately, differentiation depends on rules, data, frontline adoption, and continuous operational improvement; if that renewal slows, relative advantage can shrink

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Management, culture, and governance: discipline and systems orientation align with the story

CEO Michael P. Kehoe has consistently emphasized—rather than flashy diversification—“building long-term value across cycles in E&S through underwriting discipline and technology-enabled low-cost operations.” More recently, especially amid heightened competition in Commercial Property, the center of gravity appears to be protecting the model rather than maximizing growth rates.

Organizing leadership “tendencies” across four axes

• Vision: build a cycle-resilient earnings structure through disciplined underwriting + low-cost operations
• Style: process- and systems-oriented (mechanisms over individual heroics)
• Values: prioritize discipline, efficiency, and long-term value across cycles
• Boundaries: tends to avoid forced price cuts or growth-for-growth’s-sake in competitive phases

How it shows up in culture: fast and consistent; cost is “designed”

For an E&S underwriter built around discipline, what earns wholesale-channel trust isn’t just speed—it’s speed with consistent decisions. Cultures in this niche often emphasize repeatable judgment. Cost consciousness is less about simple frugality and more a “design choice,” implemented through systemization and automation.

Generalized patterns in employee reviews (no definitive claims)

• More likely to show up positively: fast decision-making, clear performance standards, easier progress on improvement and automation
• More likely to show up negatively: rules can feel strict and discretion limited; in competitive phases, more walk-away decisions can raise tension; greater exposure to the impact of system modernization

Organizational watch points: transition has high continuity, but workload and authority allocation should be monitored

On March 02, 2026, President/COO Brian D. Haney is scheduled to retire, and the company plans to move to a structure in which CEO Michael P. Kehoe also serves as President. This looks more like a continuity-oriented design than a disruption, but shifts in decision-making workload and authority allocation are worth monitoring. In addition, while the announced promotion of the Chief Underwriting Officer can be read as reinforcing underwriting as the cultural center, any increase in key-person dependence should be watched over time.

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Two-minute Drill (summary for long-term investors): the backbone for understanding this company

For long-term investors, the core of KNSL is a model that compounds underwriting profit by “quickly selecting difficult commercial insurance (E&S), pricing it appropriately, and operating at low cost,” while also building investment income as scale grows. Over a 10-year period, revenue and EPS have compounded strongly, and ROE in the latest FY remains high at 25.7%.

Near term, growth has moderated (TTM EPS +22.3%, revenue +18.0%), and the company is discussing intensifying competition and declining rates in its largest segment, Commercial Property. The key issue is less the slowdown itself and more ongoing verification of: “Is discipline holding in a tougher competitive phase?” “Is the wholesale-channel front door (submission volume and quality) staying healthy?” and “How does loss volatility change as reinsurance retention increases?”

• Core to watch: submission front door (wholesale) → selection → pricing discipline → low-cost operations → profitability (ROE/margins)
• Current phase: growth continues but is decelerating; margins are improving; property is a headwind
• Less visible risks: front-door concentration, loosening discipline, “hit-year” volatility from higher retention, reversal of favorable accident-year development, and stalled renewal of relative advantage as AI diffuses
• Valuation positioning (company historical): PER is below the typical past 5-year and 10-year ranges; PEG is within range but toward the low end. FCF yield and FCF margin are difficult to pin down due to insufficient TTM data